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From Gadfly to Nudge: The Genesis of 
Libertarian Paternalism 
Thomas A. Lambert* 
Nearly a decade has passed since Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein 
published Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 
(hereinafter, “Nudge”).1  The bestselling book drew popular attention to “lib-
ertarian paternalism,” a policy approach Thaler and Sunstein had previously 
proposed in their academic writing.2 
Though somewhat controversial from the start,3 the notion of libertarian 
paternalism quickly gained traction among policymakers all over the world.  In 
 
* Thomas A. Lambert holds the Wall Family Chair in Corporate Law and Governance 
at the University of Missouri School of Law.  This article is adapted from chapter nine 
of THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS (2017) 
(Cambridge University Press).  
             1. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 2. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 
AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Pa-
ternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). 
 3. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1245 (2005); Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge 
Problem of the New Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905 (2009); Mario J. Rizzo & 
Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother is Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slip-
pery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685  (2009); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, 
Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033 (2012); Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government 
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the United States, President Barack Obama tapped Sunstein to serve as the ad-
ministrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
a position often referred to as the nation’s “regulatory czar.”4  The U.S. Con-
gress created a new agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, that 
was proposed by academics who were strongly influenced by the behavioral 
economics underlying Nudge (more about behavioral economics below).5  The 
British government went so far as to create a Behavioural Insights Team, com-
monly referred to as the “Nudge Unit.”6  And in Denmark, the Applied Behav-
ioural Science Group – a.k.a. the Danish Nudge Unit – began operating a pop-
ular website, “iNudgeyou.com.”7 
Given Nudge’s success over the last decade in capturing the attention of 
policymakers and generating concrete policy proposals, it is worth pausing to 
assess how the libertarian paternalist project is faring.  What is working?  What 
is not?  How, if at all, should the libertarian paternalist project be adjusted go-
ing forward? 
On October 21, 2016, a group of prominent law professors and econo-
mists – some Nudge enthusiasts (including Sunstein himself), some skeptics – 
convened at the University of Missouri School of Law for a symposium ad-
dressing those questions.  The bulk of this issue of the Missouri Law Review 
consists of articles based on the ideas presented at that symposium, Evaluating 
Nudge: A Decade of Libertarian Paternalism. 
To provide context for the articles that follow, the remainder of this Fore-
word explains where libertarian paternalism came from – that is, what are its 
intellectual underpinnings, and how did they arise? 
I. FROM GADFLY TO BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
Before there was libertarian paternalism, there was Gadfly.  A thorn in 
the side of his economics professor, Gadfly often sticks in the memory of those 
who have taken a college-level economics course.  He majored in something 
liberal artsy (philosophy, English?) or maybe another of the social sciences 
(psychology, sociology?).  He was not a back-row student; he sat toward the 
front of the lecture hall, and he was an active participant in class discussion.  
 
Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 
(2006). 
 4. Jonathan Weisman & Jess Bravin, Obama’s Regulatory Czar Likely to Set a 
New Tone, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB123138051682263203. 
 5. See Tim Chen, The Soft Power of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
FORBES (June 17, 2011, 10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/money-
builder/2011/06/17/the-soft-power-of-the-consumer-financial-protection-bu-
reau/#21db6d553705. 
 6. See Katrin Bennhold, Britain’s Ministry of Nudges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/business/international/britains-ministry-of-
nudges.html. 
 7. See INUDGEYOU, http://inudgeyou.com/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2017). 
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But he was assuredly not buying what his economics professor was selling.  
Whenever the professor would suggest that the government should do X to in-
duce people to do Y, or that well-meaning policy A is bad because it will just 
lead people to take undesirable action B, Gadfly’s hand would shoot up.  “Real 
people don’t behave that way,” he would say.  “You’re assuming people always 
act rationally.  They often don’t.” 
The economics professor generally gave Gadfly’s remarks short shrift.  
“Yes, people sometimes act irrationally,” she replied.  “But most people act 
rationally most of the time.  And we can’t build a predictive theory of human 
behavior if we assume people just dart around making irrational, unpredictable 
decisions.” 
It turns out both Gadfly and his professor were right.  Gadfly was correct 
in observing that people often act irrationally.  The professor was right that 
people usually act rationally and that economists might as well close up shop 
if people act in unpredictable ways.  But what if people are, to borrow the title 
of economist Dan Ariely’s bestselling book, predictably irrational.8  That is, 
what if they generally act rationally but, in certain identifiable contexts, make 
the same sorts of mistakes over and over again. 
In recent years, many social scientists – including scores of economists – 
have come to believe that this is indeed how humans behave.9  Numerous stud-
ies purporting to document people’s systematically irrational behavior have led 
many scholars to jettison the so-called “rational choice” model of human be-
havior, under which humans are assumed to act as rational, self-interest maxi-
mizers.  In its place, they have adopted a “behavioral” model under which peo-
ple usually act rationally but occasionally, in systematic ways, make irrational 
decisions.10 
Libertarian paternalism arose as a policy response to this behavioral 
model of human decision-making.  Its goal is to help people make “better” 
choices – i.e., choices more in line with the decisions they would make were 
they not subject to the cognitive and volitional frailties behavioral economists 
and cognitive psychologists (collectively, “behavioralists”) claim to have iden-
tified.  To understand the libertarian paternalist project, then, one must have 
some sense of what those purported frailties are. 
 
 8. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE 
OUR DECISIONS (2008). 
 9. See generally RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2015). 
 10. See generally id. 
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II. THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
Speaking generally, we can group the cognitive and volitional limitations 
identified by behavioralists into three categories: imperfect optimization, 
bounded self-control, and non-standard preferences.11 
A. Imperfect Optimization 
Imperfect optimization refers to people’s purported tendencies to make 
systematic mistakes in choosing among alternative courses of action.  The ra-
tional choice model of human behavior assumes that people make choices that 
maximize their welfare given their resource constraints.12  To say that people 
are prone to imperfect optimization is to say that even when they have fixed 
preferences and plenty of willpower, they tend to make decisions that fail to 
wring the greatest possible value (as judged by them) from their resources.  
People make these mistakes, behavioralists say, because they are boundedly 
rational, inclined to use heuristics, and subject to systematic biases.13 
1. Bounded Rationality 
Coined by Nobel prize-winning economist Herbert Simon, the term 
“bounded rationality” refers to the fact that humans face limits on their memo-
ries, computational skills, and other mental abilities, and those limits in turn 
restrict their capacity to gather and process information.14  To say that people 
are boundedly rational is not to say that they are irrational; it is simply to 
acknowledge that humans are not computers.  Even non-behavioral economists 
concede that fact.  The notion of bounded rationality is, however, the launching 
pad for behavioral economics, which has purported to demonstrate what people 
do in light of the fact that they are not computers. 
 
 11. WILLIAM J. CONGDON, JEFFREY R. KLING, & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, 
POLICY AND CHOICE: PUBLIC FINANCE THROUGH THE LENS OF BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS 7 (2011).  We cannot, of course, delve deeply into all the quirks and limi-
tations behavioral economists purport to observe.  For a more exhaustive overview, see 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) and THALER, supra 
note 9. 
 12. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: 
A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989) (sum-
marizing the rational choice model). 
 13. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics, 64 ALA. L. REV. 389, 390 (2012). 
 14. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, in 
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 261, 271–73 (Herbert A. 
Simon, ed. 1957). 
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2. Heuristics 
One thing they do, behavioralists say, is employ mental shortcuts or “heu-
ristics.”15  People frequently need to make quick judgments about things yet 
lack the time or mental resources to gather all available information or even to 
process carefully all the facts they already know.  To use the terminology em-
ployed by Daniel Kahneman, they must rely on their reflexive “system one” 
method of thinking (an approach that is fast, instinctive, subconscious, and of-
ten emotional – the sort of thinking one uses when he dodges an object hurtling 
toward him). 16  They cannot engage in reflective “system two” thinking (an 
approach that is slower, effortful, conscious, and logical – the approach one 
uses when she is buying a new car).17  People therefore tend to use rules of 
thumb or other mental shortcuts to help them make quick decisions. 
One such mental shortcut, the “availability heuristic,” assesses the prob-
ability of an occurrence based on how easily instances of the event may be 
called to mind; the more available past instances of the event are in one’s rec-
ollection, the more probable one will deem the event to be.18  On first glance, 
this seems like a sensible mental strategy.  The more memories one has of past 
events occurring, the more probable it is that the event will recur, right? 
Not always.  Some events, though quite common, fail to stick in people’s 
memories and thus are not available to them when they are assessing probabil-
ities.  This can lead people to make irrational judgments.  For example, people 
asked to estimate how many words in a document end in “ing” give higher 
numbers than those asked to estimate how many of the writing’s words have 
“n” as the next-to-last letter.19  As a logical matter, the number of words with 
“n” as the penultimate letter must exceed (or equal) the number of words end-
ing in “ing.”  But it is easier to call to mind “ing” words than words with a 
penultimate “n.”  It is also easier to call to mind “Detroit murders” than “Mich-
igan murders,” so it is not surprising that people tend to estimate that there were 
more murders in Detroit during some time period than there were in the state 
of Michigan – a logical impossibility.20 
 
 15. Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 390 (“One of the basic lessons of cognitive psy-
chology over the last four decades has been that people use simple mental shortcuts, 
known as heuristics, to manage complexity and uncertainty.”). 
 16. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19–30 (2011). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PYSCHOL. 207, 208 (1973). 
 19. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 663 n.141 (1999) (citing 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Con-
junction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 295 (1983)). 
 20. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute 
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 78 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 
2002).  The result here may also be influenced by the “representativeness” heuristic 
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Closely related to the availability heuristic is a cognitive feature behav-
ioralists call “salience bias.”21  Big, dramatic events command notice.  They 
stick in our minds and are therefore more available to us than are regular, day-
to-day events, especially when they engage our emotions.  That implies that 
when the availability heuristic is operating, people will tend to overestimate 
the likelihood of noticeable (salient) events relative to occurrences that are less 
noteworthy but perhaps more common.  Consistent with this theory, people 
tend to think that deaths from vehicle accidents are more common than deaths 
from lung cancer and that more people die from homicide than from emphy-
sema, when in fact more people die from lung cancer than from vehicle acci-
dents and from emphysema than from homicide.22  Car wrecks and shootings 
are bloody and newsworthy (under the old newspaper adage, “If it bleeds, it 
leads.”).  Lung cancer and emphysema, though horrible, are usually neither 
gory – eliciting a visceral reaction – or widely reported.  Instances of them are 
less available. 
A second well-documented heuristic involves what Kahneman and his 
longtime co-author, Amos Tversky, called “anchoring” and “adjustment.”23  
When people are called upon to reach some conclusion – say, the number of 
pennies in a jar or the amount they are willing to pay for a new gadget –  they 
often form an initial judgment based on some simple feature and then adjust 
that estimate, dubbed an anchor, to reach a final conclusion.24  The adjustment 
is often quite conservative, causing the final judgment to be biased toward the 
anchor.25  In addition, the anchor often has little or nothing to do with the sub-
ject matter of the judgment.  This can result in some bizarre patterns of judg-
ment.   
For example, Kahneman and Tversky famously asked people to estimate 
what percentage of the countries in the United Nations (“UN”) were located in 
Africa.26  Before they did so, though, they had respondents spin a wheel of  
discussed later in the text.  See Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability 
Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Infor-
mation, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra, 
103, 103–19. 
 21. See generally Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception 
and Interaction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192 
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (“Salience biases refer to 
the fact that colorful, dynamic, or other distinctive stimuli disproportionately engage 
attention and accordingly disproportionately affect judgments.”); Paul Slovic, Percep-
tion of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987) (discussing “dread risk”). 
 22. Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Fact Versus Fears: Un-
derstanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES, supra note 21, at 463, 469. 
 23. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 
21, at 3, 14. 
 24. See id. at 14. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
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fortune that was secretly rigged to land on either ten or sixty-five.27  They first 
asked whether the percentage of African UN members was above or below that 
number, a relative question, and then proceeded to ask the absolute question 
(i.e., What precise percentage of UN members are African?).28  The result of 
the wheel spin was, of course, wholly unrelated to the matter under considera-
tion, but it still appeared to affect respondents’ answers.  For subjects who spun 
a ten, the median answer to the latter question was twenty-five percent; for 
those spinning a sixty-five, it was forty-five percent.29  The spin result, the re-
searchers suggested, served as an anchor used by respondents in answering the 
absolute question.30 
Kahneman and Tversky observed a similar result when they asked two 
groups to solve the same math problem within five seconds, but then phrased 
the problem differently for each group.31  One group was asked to solve the 
equation, 8x7x6x5x4x3x2x1=__; the other, 1x2x3x4x5x6x7x8=__.32  The for-
mer group’s median answer (2,250) was more than four times as large as the 
latter’s (512).33  Both were way off the actual answer of 40,320, but Kahneman 
and Tversky focused on the marked difference between the two sets of an-
swers.34  They contended that respondents, required to make a quick (non-re-
flective, “system one”) judgment, anchored on the first numbers in the problem 
when forming their estimates.35 
Experimental evidence suggests that anchoring and adjustment may also 
be at play when people form reservation prices – i.e., when they determine how 
much they are willing to pay for something.  In an experiment with students at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”), economists Dan Ariely, 
Drazen Prelec, and George Loewenstein held up various items – a bottle of 
wine, a cordless trackball, a textbook – and described each.36  They then had 
the MIT students say whether they would purchase each item at a price equal 
to the last two digits of their social security numbers.37  Having contemplated 
a purchase at a pretend price (the social security digits), the subjects were then 
invited to bid on the items.38  Consistent with behavioralists’ claims about an-
choring and adjustment, the wholly irrelevant social security numbers appeared 
to influence the prices bid.39  People with high social security numbers bid 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 15. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 15–16. 
 36. Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, “Coherent Arbitrariness”: 
Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 73, 76 (2003). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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substantially more than those with low numbers.40  For example, subjects 
whose last two digits were between 80 and 99 paid an average of twenty-six 
dollars for the cordless trackball, whereas those with numbers from 00 to 19 
paid an average of nine dollars.41  This hardly seems rational. 
A third mental shortcut, the “representativeness heuristic,” involves 
something that looks like stereotyping.  When asked to judge how likely it is 
that X belongs to category Y, people tend to ignore evidence about the magni-
tude of category Y – that is, how common it is for something to fall within that 
category – and rely more heavily on the degree to which X resembles a proto-
typical member of category Y.  Such thinking leads to what statisticians call 
“base rate neglect.”42 
For example, in an experiment by Kahneman and Tversky, respondents 
were lumped into three categories.43  One, the “base rate” group, was asked to 
estimate the percentages of graduate students enrolled in nine different fields 
of study (business administration, computer science, engineering, humanities 
and education, law, library science, medicine, physical and life sciences, and 
social science and social work).44  The second, the “similarity” group, was 
given a detailed description of a young man, Tom W., and was asked to rank 
the nine fields of study in terms of how prototypical Tom was of a graduate 
student in each field.45  The third group, the “prediction” group, was given the 
same description of Tom W., was told that it was written in Tom’s senior year 
of high school by a psychologist who had subjected Tom to projective tests,  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Suppose, for example, that a disease afflicts one in a thousand people.  A test 
for the disease correctly detects every instance of infection and is ninety-five percent 
accurate when the person does not have the disease.  If you test positive for the disease, 
what is the chance that you actually have it?  Most people say something like ninety-
five percent, reflecting the test’s high degree of accuracy.  In reality, your chance of 
having the disease is less than two percent.  Out of 1,000 people tested, fifty-one would 
test positive – one accurately, and fifty falsely.  A positive test result, then, would reflect 
infection in only one of fifty-one cases (1.96% of the time).  People tend to err here 
because they focus only on the test’s high accuracy rate and ignore the low base rate of 
infection. 
 43. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 21, at 48, 49–50. 
 44. Id. at 49–50. 
 45. Tom W. was described as follows: 
 
Tom W. is of high intelligence, although lacking in true creativity.  He has a 
need for order and clarity, and for neat and tidy systems in which every detail 
finds its appropriate place.  His writing is rather dull and mechanical, occasion-
ally enlivened by somewhat corny puns and by flashes of imagination of the 
sci-fi type.  He has a strong drive for competence.  He seems to have little feel 
and little sympathy for other people and does not enjoy interacting with others.  
Self-centered, he nonetheless has a deep moral sense. 
 
Id. at 49. 
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and was asked to rank the nine fields of graduate study in terms of the likeli-
hood that Tom is now a student specializing in that area.46 
One might expect that the prediction group’s judgments about the likeli-
hood that Tom would pursue a particular course of study would reflect the es-
timated popularity of that course of study.  But that is not how things turned 
out.  Instead, the prediction group’s judgments of likelihood were much closer 
to the similarity group’s rankings of representativeness than to the base rate 
group’s rankings of overall popularity of academic concentrations.47  For ex-
ample, ninety-five percent of respondents said Tom was more likely a com-
puter science student than an education or humanities student, even though the 
base rate group had estimated that far more graduate students concentrate in 
education and the humanities than in computer science.48  The findings are 
consistent with the claim that people make predictions based on how repre-
sentative (similar) something is, and not so much on what relative base rates 
are. 
The representativeness heuristic misleads people when similarity and fre-
quency diverge, and it may lead to absurd judgments.  Consider, for example, 
an experiment involving a hypothetical woman named Linda.  Subjects were 
told the following: “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.  
She majored in philosophy.  As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues 
of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.”49  Subjects were then asked to rank, in order of likelihood, 
possible futures for Linda, including “bank teller” and “bank teller and is active 
in the feminist movement.”50  In multiple iterations of this experiment, large 
majorities of respondents say the latter option (bank teller and feminist) is more 
probable than the former (bank teller).51  But that logically cannot be!  Because 
any feminist bank teller is also a bank teller, there is no way that it could be 
more likely that Linda would end up as a feminist bank teller than as a bank 
teller.  Behavioralists point to respondents’ irrational judgment as another ex-
ample of humans’ reflexive, system one mode of thinking overwhelming their 
thoughtful, system two mode. 
 
 46. Id. at 49–50. 
 47. Id. at 50–51. 
 48. Id. at 50. 
 49. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Repre-
sentativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra 
note 21, at 84, 92. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 93. 
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3. Biases 
In addition to using heuristics, behavioralists say, people tend to suffer 
from biases that may lead them to make suboptimal decisions.52  Perhaps the 
most important of these is the optimism bias.  Most humans, it seems, think 
they are more likely than average to experience good outcomes and less likely 
than average to suffer bad ones.  For example, about ninety percent of drivers 
rate themselves as above-average behind the wheel.53  Similarly, while about 
half of all marriages fail, most new spouses estimate their chances of divorcing 
as very low.54  Entrepreneurs routinely think they are especially likely to suc-
ceed.55  In a recent survey of people starting new businesses, the most common 
answer to the question, “What do you think is the chance of success for a new 
business like yours?,” was fifty percent; the most common response to “What 
is your chance of success?” was ninety percent.56  It seems most of us believe 
we are children living in Lake Wobegon.57  And that, behavioralists say, affects 
our decisions: We are more likely to take risks if we (irrationally) believe we 
are especially unlikely to experience a bad outcome.            
B. Bounded Self-Control 
The cognitive frailties discussed above prevent people from knowing 
what, given their preferences, are their best courses of action.  Behavioralists 
also maintain that people face volitional constraints – limits on their willpower.  
We know from common experience how hard it can be to forego current con-
sumption in order to secure something better in the future.  Indeed, many of us 
are so aware of our limited willpower that we voluntarily restrict our options 
so as not to succumb to temptation.58 
 
 52. See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules 
in Decision Making, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, su-
pra note 21, at 268, 268–83. 
 53. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 32. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (citing Arnold C. Cooper, Carolyn Y. Woo & William C. Dunkelberg, En-
trepreneurs’ Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J. BUS. VENTURING 97, 97–108 (1988)). 
 57. Garrison Keillor, host of the popular radio program A Prairie Home Compan-
ion regularly described the show’s setting, Lake Wobegon, as a place “where all the 
women are strong, all the men are good-looking and all the children are above average.”  
Sarah Begley, Garrison Keillor to Say So-Long to Lake Wobegon, TIME (July 20, 2015), 
http://time.com/3965277/garrison-keillor-retiring/. 
 58. This author, for example, strictly limits the number of roasted almonds he car-
ries to his easy chair when he’s reading the newspaper before dinner.  Even though he 
knows he will ultimately experience more pleasure if he eats just a few nuts and saves 
room for a well-balanced supper, experience has taught him that he simply cannot avoid 
eating too many nuts if he takes the whole can to the lounger! 
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According to behavioralists, many of our volitional frailties stem from 
our tendency to engage in “hyperbolic discounting.”59  To understand what that 
is, consider how people trade off present consumption opportunities against 
opportunities to consume in the future.60  In general, people prefer to consume 
things sooner rather than later.  Economists have thus long understood that 
when people are choosing between courses of action that will provide benefits 
at different times, they implicitly “discount” the value of future consumption 
opportunities.61  A person might, for example, deem the right to receive $110 
one year from now as worth only $100 today.  That person’s “discount rate” is 
ten percent. 
Different people exhibit different discount rates.  Those who really prefer 
present over future consumption have high discount rates, meaning that the 
future consumption opportunity must be significantly better than the current 
one in order for the person to forego current consumption.  Others, by contrast, 
have low discount rates; they need not receive much compensation for holding 
off on consumption. 
While economists have long understood that discount rates vary among 
individuals, they have generally assumed that whatever discount rate a person 
applies to a decision is constant over time.62  So, for example, a person who 
would be indifferent between $100 today and $110 one year from now would 
also be indifferent between $100 one year from now and $110 two years from 
now.  Her ten percent discount rate is the same for both one-year time delays.  
Economists refer to this as “exponential” discounting.63 
In recent years, researchers have amassed a significant body of empirical 
data suggesting that this is not how people really make tradeoffs across time.  
Evidence suggests that discount rates are not constant but that people instead 
discount future rewards at a greater rate when the delay occurs sooner in time.64  
 
 59. George Ainslie, Procrastination: The Basic Impulse, in THE THIEF OF TIME: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PROCRASTINATION 11, 12–13 (Chrisoula Andreou & Mark 
D. White eds., 2010). 
 60. Id. at 18. 
 61. See PAUL HEYNE, PETER J. BOETTKE & DAVID L. PRYCHITKO, THE ECONOMIC 
WAY OF THINKING 169–71, 191–96 (10th ed. 2003). 
 62. See THALER, supra note 9, at 89–94 (explaining how notion of a constant dis-
count rate became dominant in economics). 
 63. The term exponential discounting is used because the time delay in the formula 
for assessing the present value of a future consumption opportunity is an exponent.  A 
future reward is adjusted by a factor of 1/(1+k)t, where k is the discount rate and t is the 
number of years until consumption.  For example, for a person with a ten percent dis-
count rate, receiving $110 one year in the future requires adjusting $110 by a factor of 
1/(1+.10)1 or .9091.  (To complete the math, $110 * .9091 = $100.)  See Colin F. 
Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future, in 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 22–27 (Colin F. Camerer, George Loewen-
stein & Matthew Rabin eds., 2004). 
 64. Id. at 22. 
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For example, while many people would rather have $100 today than $110 to-
morrow, few would prefer $100 in thirty days to $110 in thirty-one.  A one-
day delay that would require little compensation if experienced a month from 
now would, for lots of people, be less tolerable – and would therefore require 
greater compensation – if experienced today.  People are said to engage in “hy-
perbolic” discounting if the rate at which they discount future rewards is not 
constant but instead rises for earlier and earlier portions of the delay period.65  
A good bit of evidence suggests that this is, in fact, how people make many 
intertemporal tradeoffs.66 
Consider, for example, overweight people who come to believe that they 
need to eat better and exercise more.  Gazing into the future, they decide they 
are willing to forego fattening foods to secure a healthier body.  When they 
compare next month’s desserts to next year’s better body, they apply a low 
discount rate, which leads them to ascribe greater value to the better body than 
to the joy from next month’s desserts.  But when dessert time rolls around to-
night, the discount rate they apply to a future better body shoots up so that 
consuming dessert tonight seems like the value-maximizing option.  After they 
blow it, they may start thinking again about future consumption tradeoffs – say, 
enjoying next month’s holiday parties versus feeling good in a swimsuit next 
summer – and jump back on the diet.  But, when another immediate consump-
tion opportunity arises, the value of looking fit next summer suddenly seems 
awfully small.  If a person engages in hyperbolic discounting of this sort, then 
even when her reasoning abilities enable her to ascertain the course of action 
that will bring her the greatest happiness (given her preferences), she may find 
herself lacking the willpower to stay on course. 
C. Non-Standard Preferences 
In addition to assuming that people possess the cognitive and volitional 
abilities to identify and follow the course of action that maximizes their welfare 
in light of their preferences, the rational choice model assumes that people’s 
preferences – the degree to which they value one thing over another – are in-
dependent of the context in which choices are presented (or, to use some jar-
gon, are “exogenous” rather than “endogenous”).67  Behavioralists dispute that 
assumption.  They point to evidence suggesting that institutional arrangements, 
particularly the allocation of property rights and other entitlements, help deter-
mine the value people attach to various outcomes.  
 65. The term hyperbolic discounting is used because the formula for the factor by 
which a future reward must be adjusted is the same as the generalized function for a 
hyperbola.  (The math is beyond our scope.)  Id. at 23. 
 66. Id. at 23–27 (summarizing empirical evidence that people engage in hyper-
bolic discounting). 
 67. Id. at 12 (“Standard preference theory . . . assumes that preferences are ‘refer-
ence independent’ – i.e., they are not affected by the individual’s transient asset position 
. . . [and] are invariant with respect to superficial variations in the way that options are 
described . . . .”). 
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Most notably, behavioralists claim that people exhibit an “endowment ef-
fect” under which the value they ascribe to a thing – a piece of property, a 
service, a legal right – depends in part on whether or not they own it.68  Most 
of the evidence for this effect has been experimental.  In dozens of experiments, 
the average minimum price that would be charged by a group of people who 
have been given an item (the average “willingness-to-accept” or “WTA”) ex-
ceeds the average maximum price that a similarly situated group of people who 
have not been given the item would pay for it (the average “willingness-to-
pay” or “WTP”).69  Both measures should reflect the subjective valuation a 
person ascribes to the thing at issue: WTA is the minimum amount an owner 
would have to be paid to part with the thing; WTP is the maximum amount a 
non-owner would be willing to give up to get it.  If owners’ WTA for a thing 
routinely exceeds non-owners’ WTP for the exact same thing, behavioralists 
contend, then the mere fact of ownership must enhance the subjective value 
attributed to the thing.70 
In a typical experiment, half the students in a class were given coffee 
mugs bearing their school’s insignia, and the others were directed to examine 
their neighbors’ mugs so that all students would have an idea of the mugs’ 
quality.71  Mug owners were then invited to sell, and non-owners to buy, the 
mugs that had been distributed.72  Specifically, each student was asked to state 
his or her reservation price – the student’s subjective valuation of the mug – by 
responding to the following prompt, “At each of the following prices, indicate 
whether you would be willing to (give up your mug/buy a mug).”73  On aver-
age, those who had been given mugs demanded roughly twice as much to sell 
them (WTA) as non-owners were willing to pay to acquire them (WTP).74 
In a similar experiment, half the students in a class were given coffee 
mugs (for some reason, the standard item for these sorts of experiments), and 
the other half received big chocolate bars that cost roughly the same amount as 
the mugs.75  In tests conducted before the experiment, students were as likely 
to pick one of the items as the other.76  After they owned one of the items and 
were given an opportunity to trade it for the other, however, very few made the 
 
 68. Id. at 15. 
 69. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 33. 
 70. Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 63, at 15–16. 
 71. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 33. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The En-
dowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 193, 196 
(1991). 
 75. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 34. 
 76. Id. 
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trade.77  Only one in ten switched from the item they were given.78  The sug-
gestion is that owning the items distributed to them caused students to value 
those items more than they otherwise would. 
There is evidence suggesting that the apparent endowment effect may be 
a function of experimental design.  For example, after economists Charles Plott 
and Kathryn Zeiler conducted standard coffee mug experiments and observed 
the usual result (WTA > WTP), they repeated the experiments using best prac-
tice for experimental design, and the apparent endowment effect disappeared.79  
Although the work by Plott and Zeiler has generated its own controversy,80 it 
does call into question the stronger claims about the endowment effect.  Most 
behavioral legal scholars, however, deem the evidence settled: Endowing a per-
son with a thing causes him or her to value it more.81 
Closely related to the endowment effect is a tendency behavioralists refer 
to as “loss aversion.”  In their “prospect theory” of human behavior, Kahneman 
and Tversky asserted that people tend to evaluate outcomes not in isolation but 
relative to an initial reference point, and they noted empirical evidence that 
people weigh losses from a reference point more heavily than correlative 
gains.82  (Consistent with the endowment effect, if a person must give up some-
thing she owns, she is hurt more than she is pleased if she initially gains that 
same thing.) 
Again, much of the evidence for loss aversion is experimental.  In a typi-
cal experiment, subjects were asked to imagine a coin toss in which they will 
win some amount of money (X dollars) if the coin lands on heads but will have 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Ac-
cept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Proce-
dures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 530 (2005); see also Charles 
R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence 
of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1450 
(2007) (finding same). 
 80. See Andrea Isoni, Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, The Willingness to Pay-
Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Ex-
perimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Comment, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 991 
(2011); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Ac-
cept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Proce-
dures for Eliciting Valuations: Reply, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1012 (2011). 
 81. In the five years following the publication of the Plott and Zeiler studies in the 
high-profile American Economic Review, fewer than ten percent of legal publications 
referring to the endowment effect bothered to cite Plott and Zeiler’s work. Joshua D. 
Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal 
Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW U. L. REV. 1033, 1047–48 (2012). 
 82. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sion Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277–79 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. 
ECON. 1039, 1041–42 (1991). 
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to pay $100 if it lands on tails.83  When asked how large X must be in order for 
them to participate in the coin toss, most subjects responded with a number 
near $200.84  This implies that people hate losses so much that they will give 
up opportunities worth up to twice the amount of the losses in order to avoid 
them.  (In refusing to engage in the coin toss if the payment for heads is, say, 
$180, a subject is effectively saying that an expected loss of $50 hurts him 
more than an expected gain of $90 benefits him.) 
The endowment effect and loss aversion, behavioralists assert, give rise 
to two other predictable quirks.  One is a “status quo bias.”  If people tend to 
attach extra value to their initial set of entitlements, and if the losses they ex-
perience from changing things weigh heavier than the gains they experience 
from change, they will tend to leave things as they are.85  In addition, say the 
behavioralists, people are subject to “framing effects”; since people perceive 
losses as weighing more than correlative gains, whether an opportunity is 
framed as a gain or a loss matters.86 
Consider, for instance, two statements that convey the same information 
about the risks of a surgical procedure: 
Statement A: “Of 100 patients who have this operation, ninety are alive 
after five years.” 
Statement B: “Of 100 patients who have this operation, ten are dead 
after five years.” 
In numerous experiments, people presented with Statement A, which fo-
cuses on gains, are much more likely to select the procedure than are people 
presented with Statement B, which emphasizes losses.87  Indeed, even experts 
may be subject to framing effects.  Doctors deciding whether to recommend a 
procedure are more likely to do so if they are told “90 of 100 are alive” after 
some period of time rather than “10 of 100 are dead.”88 
To the extent they really exist, the endowment effect, loss aversion, status 
quo biases, and framing effects imply that people’s preferences – and the out-
comes that follow from them – are largely constructed by government policy.  
How government allocates entitlements influences people’s preferences for 
those entitlements (endowment effect).  People often will not give up what they 
have in order to get something that they would have perceived as better had it 
been initially allocated to them (loss aversion / status quo bias).  And people’s 
decisions about what outcomes to pursue may turn on whether those outcomes 
are presented as potential gains or losses (framing effects). 
 
 83. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 33–34. 
 84. Id. at 34. 
 85. Id. at 34–35. 
 86. Id. at 36–37; Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 63, at 12–14. 
 87. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 36. 
 88. Id. 
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If the rational choice model’s homo economicus is Superman, behavior-
alism’s prototypical human is Ralph Hinkley, the hapless protagonist of the 
early 1980s television show The Greatest American Hero.  Hinkley was often 
confused.  He relied on hunches.  He had remarkable powers, but he could not 
control them.  He was more confident than he should have been, given his lim-
itations.  He was reluctant to disrupt the status quo.  And he made lots of blun-
ders.  The same goes for us humans, behavioralists say.  As a result, we rou- 
tinely fail to maximize our welfare, and we suffer regret. 
III. THE LIBERTARIAN PATERNALIST RESPONSE 
So what should the government do about this unhappy situation?  One 
response would be to have government planners override individual decision-
making in areas in which people’s cognitive and volitional limitations are 
likely to lead them to make decisions other than those they would make if they 
were fully rational and had boundless self-control.  Under such an approach – 
hard paternalism – the government could force people to save more, eat better, 
or otherwise act or forbear as government planners believe people would do 
were they not so limited in reason and willpower. 
There are two obvious drawbacks to such an approach.  First, it requires 
a tremendous amount of knowledge on the part of the planners, who are not 
privy to individuals’ true preferences and values.  We may call that difficulty 
paternalism’s “knowledge problem.”89   Second, hard paternalism creates 
“public choice concerns” by endowing government planners with vast discre-
tionary authority that may be manipulated by private interests for ends that do 
not maximize social welfare.90 
In light of these two difficulties, governments in liberal societies have 
generally eschewed paternalistic solutions to judgment errors resulting from 
 
 89. See generally F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519 (1945). 
 90. See William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS 427, 427–30 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008).  Public choice theory as-
sumes that the motivations of actors in the political process – from voters to lobbyists 
to bureaucrats to politicians – are no different from those of people participating in 
grocery, housing, or car markets.  Id. at 428.  Voters “vote their pocketbooks”; lobbyists 
seek the money and prestige that comes from securing competitive advantages for their 
clients; bureaucrats strive for job advancement, with its enhanced power and income; 
and politicians seek election and re-election.  Id.  While all these parties may seek to 
mask this “crass” self-interest by paying lip service to altruistic considerations, self-
interest lurks beneath the surface.  See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The 
Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 REGULATION 12 (1983).  In the memorable 
words of Nobel laureate James Buchanan, public choice is simply “politics without 
romance.”  James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public 
Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE – II 
11 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984). 
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decision-makers’ cognitive and volitional limitations.91  While one finds occa-
sional examples of such paternalism – for example, the ban on soft drugs whose 
use entails few obvious third-party effects – most seemingly paternalistic pol-
icies are conceivably justifiable on grounds of preventing harm to others.  Ab-
sent a threat of significant externalities, there seems to be little enthusiasm in 
liberal societies for government meddling in individual decision-making, even 
when personal choices may be influenced by the choosers’ cognitive and voli-
tional constraints.92 
Consider, for example, people’s career decisions.  Planning and preparing 
for one’s career involves making a host of predictions (where heuristics and 
biases play a role) and may demand a great deal of volitional fortitude (which 
hyperbolic discounting may impair).  Thus, as behavioralists would predict, 
people regularly make career decisions that they end up regretting.  Yet, it is 
virtually unheard of in liberal societies for government officials to coerce peo-
ple – or even to cajole them – into one career over another.  The same goes for 
the rest of life’s major decisions, many of which may be less than optimal be-
cause of people’s various human frailties.  Governments typically leave those 
decisions to individuals themselves, knowing full well that people will often 
choose poorly. 
Indeed, in most areas of decision-making, the approach liberal govern-
ments have taken to personal decision-making resembles that promoted by 
John Stuart Mill, who wrote that 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant.  He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it 
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, be-
cause, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.93 
Mill’s libertarian approach avoids the knowledge problem and public 
choice concerns arising from paternalism, but it does nothing to address the 
harm (regret, etc.) that results when individuals, because of their cognitive and 
volitional limitations, make decisions that are different from those they would 
have made if they were not so limited. 
The central claim of libertarian paternalism is that there is middle ground 
between paternalism, which employs bans and commands to override individ-
ual decision-making even absent third-party effects, and libertarianism, under 
which government stays its hand in influencing individual decision-making un-
less intervention is needed to prevent third-party harm.  Within that territory, 
libertarian paternalists say, lies an approach under which planners construct 
 
 91. See Buchanan, supra note 90, at 15. 
 92. See id. at 20. 
 93. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY 5, 13 (Stefan Collini ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859). 
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“choice architecture” that steers people toward ends that are best for them (as 
they themselves would judge were they operating free of cognitive and voli-
tional limitations), while simultaneously protecting people’s freedom of choice 
by allowing them to opt out of specified arrangements should they choose to 
do so.  The approach is paternalistic in that its stated goal is to help people do 
what is best for them, not to prevent harm to others.  It is libertarian, proponents 
contend, in that it ultimately leaves people free to choose; it “nudges” rather 
than coerces. 
Perhaps the classic example of a libertarian paternalist nudge is switching 
the default rule on participation in employer-sponsored savings plans – 401Ks, 
etc. –  from opt-in (where the employee must sign up for the plan) to opt-out 
(where the employee is automatically enrolled but may withdraw if she 
chooses).  Behavioralism predicts that the status quo bias and people’s ten-
dency to engage in hyperbolic discounting will prevent many employees from 
enrolling in savings plans even when they would “really” prefer to save more.  
Altering the choice architecture from an opt-in to an opt-out default rule, liber-
tarian paternalists assert, harnesses the status quo bias to nudge employees in 
the direction that is, by employees’ own considered lights, good for them.94  
But, because participation at the standard savings rate is merely a default rule, 
any employee who prefers another course of action may freely take it.  Nudge 
presents a number of similar ideas for implementing libertarian paternalism. 
 
IV. THE ARTICLES THAT FOLLOW: SECOND GENERATION 
SCHOLARSHIP 
So how is libertarian paternalism faring?  Does actual experience suggest 
that it is viable regulatory strategy?  Has it led to unintended consequences, 
and how, if at all, should it be tweaked going forward?  Addressing these and 
similar questions, the articles that follow represent a second generation of 
scholarship on libertarian paternalism.  First generation scholarship, produced 
around or soon after the time of Nudge’s publication, considered libertarian 
paternalism’s theoretical promise and limitations.95  The articles that follow 
supplement that first generation scholarship with insights based on actual ex-
perience.  Such experience has shown, for example, that automatic enrollment 
in employer-sponsored savings plans – libertarian paternalism’s poster child – 
may increase employee participation rates but reduce the overall amounts 
saved by locking participating employees into default savings rates.96 
 
 94. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 108–09 (describing automatic en-
rollment as a salutary libertarian paternalist intervention). 
 95. See sources cited supra notes 2–3 (citing early scholarship advocating and crit-
icizing libertarian paternalism). 
 96. See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or for Worse: Default Effects and 
401(k) Savings Behavior 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8651, 
2002); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails 
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The remaining contributions to this symposium issue highlight a number 
of additional lessons (and raise many issues for future debate): 
 
 Professor Sunstein himself kicks things off by revisiting “forced 
choosing,” a form of choice architecture endorsed in Nudge.97  He 
contends that forced choosing is itself paternalistic (though not nec-
essarily bad).98 
 Jacob Goldin draws a distinction between consistent and inconsistent 
choosers and considers the effect of choice architecture on each.99  He 
then introduces the notion of “quasi-paternalistic” nudges and shows 
how their existence may influence the policy choice between nudges 
and mandates.100 
 Jonathan Lee and Hengchen Dai explain the notion of “fresh starts” 
and describe some fascinating empirical findings that may suggest 
ways for policymakers to craft more efficacious nudges.101 
 Gregory Mitchell observes that the term “nudge” has expanded to en-
compass all sorts of interventions that could in no way be deemed 
libertarian paternalism.102  He queries whether the nudge label is be-
ing “used opportunistically, as cover for run-of-the-mill paternal-
ism,”103 and he sets forth criteria for identifying which nudges could 
be accurately labeled as libertarian. 
 Arden Rowell addresses a potential problem resulting from libertar-
ian paternalism’s success in achieving traction among policymak-
ers.104  Observing that the proliferation of nudges will entail “nudge-
nudge interactions,” she counsels policymakers to develop strategies 
for managing situations in which different nudges conflict with, un-
dermine, and/or strengthen one another.105 
 
and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1618–25 (2014); see also Anne Tergesen, 401(k) 
Law Suppresses Saving for Retirement, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303365804576430153643522780. 
 97. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 109–10. 
 98. See Cass R. Sunstein, Forcing People to Choose Is Paternalistic, 82 MO. L. 
REV. 643 (2017). 
 99. Jacob Goldin, Libertarian Quasi-Paternalism, 82 MO. L. REV. 669 (2017). 
 100. Id.  
 101. Jonathan Lee & Hengchen Dai, The Motivating Effects of Temporal Land-
marks: Evidence from the Field and Lab, 82 MO. L. REV. 683 (2017). 
 102. Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Nudges, 82 MO. L. REV. 695 (2017). 
 103. Id. at 696. 
 104. Arden Rowell, Once and Future Nudges, 82 MO. L. REV. 709 (2017). 
 105. Id. at 719–22. 
19
Lambert: From Gadfly to Nudge
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
642 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
 Victoria Shaffer reviews evidence on the effectiveness of nudges in 
the health care arena.106  She concludes that nudging, while no pana-
cea, is one effective tool for generating significant and salutary be-
havioral changes in the area of human health.107 
 Adam Smith addresses the issue of public choice, contending that the 
structure of the institutions crafting choice architecture matters a 
great deal for libertarian paternalism’s success.108  He draws lessons 
from a comparison of two behaviorally informed policymaking insti-
tutions: the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the U.K. 
Behavioural Insights Team.109 
 Todd Zywicki, Geoffrey Manne, and Kristian Stout counsel caution 
in the use of behavioral law and economics in judicial proceedings.110  
Focusing on a recent Supreme Court case, the authors highlight what 
they perceive to be a misuse of behavioral theories in constitutional 
argument.111  They maintain that proponents of behavioral law and 
economics have often paid too little attention to conflicting empirical 
evidence and have given short shrift to rational explanations for ob-
served behavior.112 
 
With that, the stage is set.  Let the Nudge Fest commence. 
 
 
 106. Victoria A. Shaffer, Nudges for Health Policy: Effectiveness and Limitations, 
82 MO. L. REV. 727 (2017). 
 107. Id. at 736. 
 108. Adam C. Smith, Utilizing Behavioral Insights (Without Romance) An Inquiry 
into the Choice Architecture of Public Decision-Making, 82 MO. L. REV. 737 (2017). 
 109. Id. at 752–61. 
 110. Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne & Kristian Stout, Behavioral Economics 
Goes to Court: The Fundamental Flaws in the Behavioral Law & Economics Argu-
ments Against No-Surcharge Laws, 82 MO. L. REV. 769 (2017). 
 111. Id. at 800–08. 
 112. Id. at 840–41. 
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